Apple’s plan to find CSAM should have centered around scanning images on iCloud servers, not on users’ devices, where there is a greater expectation of privacy 全新相機收購

全新相機收購rTipline, or any successor to the CyberTipline operated by NCMEC.

There is no escaping this responsibility when and if CSAM is discovered:

(e)Failure To Report.—A provider that knowingly and willfully fails to make a report required under subsection (a)(1) shall be fined—

(1) in the case of an initial knowing and willful failure to make a report, not more than $150,000; and
(2) in the case of any second or subsequent knowing and willful failure to make a report, not more than $300,000.

What is not required is that companies actively seek out CSAM on their services:

(f)Protection of Privacy.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a provider to—

(1) monitor any user, subscriber, or customer of that provider;
(2) monitor the content of any communication of any person described in paragraph (1); or
(3) affirmatively search, screen, or scan for facts or circumstances described in sections (a) and (b).

These two provisions get at why Facebook and Apple’s reported numbers have historically been so different: it’s not because there is somehow more CSAM on Facebook than exists on Apple devices, but rather that Facebook is scanning all of the images sent to and over its service, while Apple is not looking at what is in your phone, or on their cloud. From there the numbers make much more sense: Facebook is reporting what it finds, while Apple is, as the title of Section (3) suggests, protecting privacy and simply not looking at images at all.
Apple Protects Children
Last week Apple put up a special page on their website entitled Expanded Protections for Children:

At Apple, our goal is to create technology that empowers people and enriches their lives — while helping them stay safe. We want to help protect children from predators who use communication tools to recruit and exploit them, and limit the spread of Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM).
Apple is introducing new child safety features in three areas, developed in collaboration with child safety experts. First, new communication tools will enable parents to play a more informed role in helping their children navigate communication online. The Messages app will use on-device machine learning to warn about sensitive content, while keeping private communications unreadable by Apple.
Next, iOS and iPadOS will use new applications of cryptography to help limit the spread of CSAM online, while designing for user privacy. CSAM detection will help Apple provide valuable information to law enforcement on collections of CSAM in iCloud Photos.
Finally, updates to Siri and Search provide parents and children expanded information and help if they encounter unsafe situations. Siri and Search will also intervene when users try to search for CSAM-related topics.

John Gruber at Daring Fireball has a good overview of what are in fact three very different initiatives; what unites, them, though, and continues to differentiate Apple’s approach from Facebook’s, is that Apple is scanning content on your device, while Facebook is doing it in the cloud. Apple emphasized repeatedly that this ensured that Apple does not get access to your content. From the “Communications Safety in Messages” section:

Messages uses on-device machine learning to analyze image attachments and determine if a photo is sexually explicit. The feature is designed so that Apple does not get access to the messages.

From the “CSAM Detection” section:

Apple’s method of detecting known CSAM is designed with user privacy in mind. Instead of scanning images in the cloud, the system performs on-device matching using a database of known CSAM image hashes provided by NCMEC and other child safety organizations…This innovative new technology allows Apple to provide valuable and actionable information to NCMEC and law enforcement regarding the proliferation of known CSAM. And it does so while providing significant privacy benefits over existing techniques since Apple only learns about users’ photos if they have a collection of known CSAM in their iCloud Photos account. Even in these cases, Apple only learns about images that match known CSAM.

There are three ways to think about Apple’s approach, both in isolation and relative to a service like Facebook:2 the idealized outcome, the worst case outcome, and the likely driver.
Capability Versus Policy
Apple’s idealized outcome solves a lot of seemingly intractable problems. On one hand, CSAM is horrific and Apple hasn’t been doing anything about it; on the other hand, the company has a longstanding commitment to ever increasing amounts of encryption, ideally end-to-end. Apple’s system, if it works precisely as designed, preserves both goals: the company can not only keep end-to-end encryption in Messages, but also add it to iCloud Photos (which is not currently encrypted end-to-end), secure in the knowledge that it is doing its part to not only report CSAM but also help parents look after their children. And, from a business perspective, it means that Apple can continue to not make the massive investments that companies like Facebook have in trust-and-safety teams; the algorithm will take care of it.
That, of course, is the rub: Apple controls the algorithm, both in terms of what it looks for and what bugs it may or may not have, as well as the input, which in the case of CSAM scanning is the database from NCMEC. Apple has certainly worked hard to be a company that users trust, but we already know that that trust doesn’t extend everywhere: Apple has, under Chinese government pressure, put Chinese user iCloud data on state-owned enterprise servers, along with the encryption keys necessary to access it. What happens when China announces its version of the NCMEC, which not only includes the horrific imagery Apple’s system is meant to capture, but also images and memes the government deems illegal?
The fundamental issue — and the first reason why I think Apple made a mistake here — is that there is a meaningful difference between capability and policy. One of the most powerful arguments in Apple’s favor in the 2016 San Bernardino case is that the company didn’t even have the means to break into the iPhone in question, and that to build the capability would open the company up to a multitude of requests that were far less pressing in nature, and weaken the company’s ability to stand up to foreign governments. In this case, though, Apple is building the capability, and the only thing holding the company back is policy.
Then again, Apple’s policy isn’t the only one that matters: both the UK and the EU are moving forward on bills that mandate online service companies proactively look for and report CSAM. Indeed, I wouldn’t be surprised if this were the most important factor behind Apple’s move: the company doesn’t want to give up on end-to-end encryption — and likely wants to expand it — which leaves on-device scanning as the only way to satisfy governments not (just) in China but also the West.
Cloud Versus Device
I think that there is another solution to Apple’s conundrum; what is frustrating from my perspective is that I think the company is already mostly there. Consider the status quo: back in 2020 Reuters reported that Apple decided to not encrypt iCloud backups at the FBI’s request:

Apple Inc. dropped plans to let iPhone users fully encrypt backups of their devices in the company’s iCloud service after the FBI complained that the move would harm investigations, six sources familiar with the matter told Reuters. The tech giant’s reversal, about two years ago, has not previously been reported. It shows how much Apple has been willing to help U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies, despite taking a harder line in high-profile legal disputes with the government and casting itself as a defender of its customers’ information.

This has a number of significant implications for Apple’s security claims, and is why earlier this year I ranked iMessage as being less secure than Signal, WhatsApp, Telegram, and Facebook Messenger:

iMessage encrypts messages end-to-end by default; however, if you have iCloud backup turned on, your messages can be accessed by Apple (who has the keys for iCloud backups) and, by extension, law enforcement with a warrant. Unlike WhatsApp, though, this is both on by default and cannot be turned off on a granular basis.

This caveat applies to almost everything on your iPhone: if you give in to the never-ending prompts to sign-in to iCloud and its on-by-default backup solution, your data is accessible to Apple and, by extension, law enforcement with a warrant. I actually think this is reasonable! I wrote this when that Reuters report came out:

Go back to what I said above: determined actors will have access to encryption and facial recognition. Anyone trying to argue whether or not these technologies should exist is not living in reality. It follows then, that we should take care to ensure that good actors have access to these technologies too. That means not making them illegal.
Second, though, legitimate societal concerns about the needs of law enforcement and the radicalizing nature of the Internet should be taken seriously. That means we should think very carefully about making encryption the default…This also splits the difference when it comes to principles: users have agency — they can ensure that everything they do is encrypted — while total privacy is available but not given by default.
I actually think that Apple does an excellent job of striking that balance today. When it comes to the iPhone itself, Apple is the only entity that can make it truly secure; no individual can build their own secure enclave that sits at the root of iPhone security. Therefore, they are right to do so: everyone has access to encryption.
From there it is possible to build a fully secure environment: use only encrypted communications, use encrypted backups to a computer secured by its own hardware-based authentication scheme, etc. Taking the slightly easier route, though — iCloud backups, Facebook messaging, etc. —

隨著影音平台崛起，比起單純靜態拍照，愈來愈多民眾喜愛以生動活拍的影片紀錄生活，然而手機畫質、防震效果都不理想，購買傳統單眼相機又過於沉重，該怎麼辦呢？近年其實有不少新型態相機可以參考，身材更輕巧，價格也更為親民，是拍攝 VLOG 的好選擇。

Osmo Pocket 3 售價 17,990 元。（圖／翻攝DJI官網）

由 DJI 所推出的雲台相機 Osmo Pocket 3 近期掀起一波搶購熱潮，憑藉的是強力的穩定性與握持手感。從最根本的設計 Osmo Pocket 3 就與傳統相機不一樣，採用如手把一樣的機身，不只是便於收納攜帶，也能夠全程以單手握持兼操作，整機融入了雲台增穩技術，可以在不裁切的情況下達到三軸穩定，讓拍攝的畫面不再左右搖晃，能輕鬆拍出 4K、120fps 影片。

請繼續往下閱讀…

全新相機收購canon PowerShot V10 售價 13,990 元（圖／記者黃肇祥攝）

相機大廠 全新相機收購canon 勇於創新，推出專為 VLOG、直播而生的 PowerShot V10，採用直立式設計，同樣是為了方便單手握持，搭載 19mm F2.8 超廣角定焦鏡頭，即便沒有自拍桿也有足夠廣闊的視角，不會讓整張人臉佔據畫面。全新相機收購canon 還在機身上設計可伸縮式支架，就算無法騰出雙手握持相機，也能擺在桌面上繼續拍攝，像是可以搭配 App 與 Youtube、Facebook 進行直播，或者應用在拍攝美食的自拍畫面。

Insta360 X4 售價 18,899 元（圖／翻攝Insta360 官網）

如果普通的拍攝視角無法滿足你，不妨透過 360 全景相機捕捉更有趣的畫面。假日喜愛上山下海，就可以考慮購買運動相機 Insta360 X4，裸機能達到 IPX8 防水等級，實現 10 米的防水，搭配專屬保護殼更能深入海水浮淺拍攝，並且支援 360°全景、隱形自拍桿、可以圍繞拍攝者錄影的 8 倍慢動作子彈時間，能拍出一般相機難以實現的特殊畫面。

全新相機收購 全新相機收購